Wednesday, September 23, 2015

Shelton v. Marshall: Murder Conviction Reversed After State Suppressed Brady Evidence

       In Shelton v. Marshall (9th Cir. 2015) 796 F.3d 1075,  a convicted defendant submitted a habeas petition to the Ninth Circuit claiming that his convictions for first-degree murder and second-degree murder of a young couple, among other crimes, should be reversed because the state failed to turn over Brady material. The Ninth Circuit agreed with one of his claims, and reversed that claim, but not the others. 


Facts 


Joseph Shelton is serving 40 years to life for the kidnapping and murder of Kevin Thorpe and Laura Craig in 1981, and appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Ninth Circuit. Evidence presented at trial established that in 1981, Shelton and two others  kidnapped and murdered a young couple who were on their way to college. Shelton was convicted of first degree murder of the young man, Thorpe, and second degree murder of the young woman, Craig, and other charges. One of the prosecution's key witnesses, Norman Thomas,  was one of Shelton's accomplices.  

Shelton later learned that Thomas' attorney believed that Thomas was not competent to assist in his own defense and was possibly insane, and he approached the prosecutor prior to Shelton's trial regarding a deal. The prosecutor knew that a psychiatric examination of Thomas would "supply ammunition to the defense" and agreed to drop murder charges against Thomas if he testified against Shelton and another accomplice, and he did not have a psychiatric examination. This deal was not disclosed to Shelton's attorney. Shelton sought state and federal relief on a Brady claim. 



3 Elements of a Brady claim


There are three elements of a Brady claim: (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) prejudice ensued. The State court denied Shelton's petition, finding it hard to conclude that anything favorable to him was suppressed. But the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that "evidence that the prosecution believed Thomas to be incompetent was powerful fodder for impeaching his testimony against Shelton."  Under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, Shelton satisfied the first element of Brady because the evidence was favorable. It was also not disclosed.

The Ninth Circuit found prejudice because Thomas’s testimony was central to the prosecution’s case to prove that Shelton premeditated and deliberated regarding Thorpe’s murder.  Prejudice ensued because Thomas' testimony was the only direct evidence that Shelton premeditated and deliberated Thorpe's murder. "The prosecutor's own conduct in keeping the deal secret underscores the deal's importance."  Thus, the court found that there is a reasonable probability that had the jury known of the prosecution’s serious doubts as to Thomas’s mental competence and of its successful efforts to prevent him from obtaining a competency test until after he testified, it would have reached a different result on that count. 


But even had Thomas been impeached by evidence of the secret deal with the prosecution regarding his competency, there is not a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result with respect to Sheldon’s convictions for the second-degree murder of Craig, kidnapping, and theft. Thus, the convictions were affirmed as to those counts.



Holding


Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the prosecution’s suppression of a material part of its deal with a key witness, Norman Thomas, violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), with respect to Shelton’s conviction for the first degree murder of Thorpe and ordered the writ granted as to that conviction.

copyright © 2015 Christine Esser

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